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Executive Summary
Patents vary substantially in the degree of protection provided against unauthorized imitation. In this chapter we explore a range of work addressing
the economic and policy implications of "weak" patents--patents that have
a significant probability of being overturned or being circumvented relatively
easily---on innovation and disclosure incentives, antitrust policy, and organizational incentives and entrepreneurial activity.
Weak patents cause firms to rely more heavily on secrecy. Thus, the competitive environment is characterized by private information about the extent of
the innovator's know-how. In such an environment weak patents increase the
likelihood of imitation and infringement, reduce the amount of knowledge
publicly disclosed, and potentially reduce the incentives to innovate.
The discussion also highlights some implications of weak patents for antitrust
policy. Weak patent rights increase the likelihood of patent litigation over commercially valuable patents and raise the specter of anticompetitive settlements.
Encouraging the antitrust agencies to refer some patents for re-examination by
the patent office would facilitate investigation of potentially anticompetitive IP
settlements.
Finally, we note some implications for weak property rights in settings involving employee-inventors and employee misuse of confidential information. In
the former case an increase in the strength of legal property rights such as patents reduces the employer's ability to prevent employees departing with valuable know-how, in part because a stronger property right increases the value
of the employee's start-up option. In the latter case, an increase in legal penalties for breach of confidentiality has the expected effect of decreasing such
occurrences.
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I. Introduction
All patents are not created equal. They vary substantially in the degree
of protection provided against unauthorized imitation. Thus, patent
strength-or the lack thereof-is a major concern for innovators and
imitators alike. Patents may lack strength for a number of reasons,
including that they have a significant probability of being overturned
or they are relatively easy to circumvent. We refer to patents with such
characteristics as "weak," though this category also includes patents of
middling strength.
Intellectual property policy discussions often adopt a perspective
on patents that implicitly assumes the characteristics associated with
strong patents. But research suggests that this starting point may be
unjustified and potentially misleading because the economic and policy implications of weak patents frequently differ from those of strong
patents. For example, weak patents cause firms to rely more heavily
on secrecy, which, in turn, creates an environment in which competing
firms lack economically important information about the capabilities of
their competitors.
This chapter explores the economic and policy implications of weak
patents. We begin by exploring the significance of weak patent rights
in the presence of private information. The remaining sections then
discuss the implications of weak patent rights and private information
on innovation and disclosure incentives, antitrust policy, and organizational incentives and entrepreneurial activity.
II. The Strategic and Policy Implications of Weak Intellectual
Property and Private Information
Weak patent rights and private information interact and, therefore, are
best considered together. We briefly discuss each factor in turn and then
consider their interaction.
The Ubiquity of Weak PatentRights
Considerable evidence suggests that for a wide array of technologies
(and hence industries) patent protection is not strong. This section
reviews some of the evidence regarding variations in the strength of
patent protection.
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Evidence of Weak Patents. A substantial proportion of patents
granted in the United States are at risk for being invalidated or narrowed. Determining the precise percentage of such dubious patents
is difficult, but studies of patent overturn rates are suggestive on this
count.' Along these lines, Allison and Lemley (1998) found that among
patents challenged on validity grounds, about 46 percent of litigated
patents were overturned between 1989 and 1996. Prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit in 1982 this percentage was closer to 65 percent.
Insufficiency of examination resources is an important contributor to
2
the patent quality that results in such reversal rates.
Under the U.S. patent system careful examination of all patent applications would be extremely costly. Because the vast majority of patents
have little or no ultimate economic value, a close examination of all
patent applications arguably wastes resources (see, e.g., Lemley 1990).
Patents that have economic value and that are legally questionable are
natural targets for litigation by competitors or other affected parties.
Litigation focuses intense scrutiny on precisely those patents that matter. Many consider patents as "licenses to sue" and it is through the
litigation process that the true strength of a particular patent emerges.
In addition to legal soundness, patent strength also depends on the
ability to exclude economically "close" substitute technologies. If such a
circumventing technology results in a product that has comparable performance and cost characteristics as a product embodying the patented
technology, then the private economic value of the patent is lessened.
The Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al. (2001) surveys of intellectual property appropriability provide evidence suggesting that (1) the
strength of property rights varies significantly by types of invention
(or industry) and (2) in a large number of industries, trade secrecy
is as important, or more important, than patents for appropriating
the rents to invention. An earlier study by Mansfield, Schwartz, and
Wagner (1981) examined 48 innovations (of which approximately 70
percent were patented) and found that about 60 percent were imitated
within four years. This finding also suggests that the patents were not
strong enough to deter infringement or avoid close circumvention.
Uncertain Patents. Many patents may also be perceived as weak
when issued, in part because they involve issues of first impression.
Later, some of these patents may be viewed as strong. In technical fields
that involve a new class of technology, considerable uncertainty may
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exist regarding patent scope, or even the availability of protection at
all. It was initially unclear, for example, whether a genetically altered
living organism could be patented and some patents in biotechnology
have been criticized as overexpansive, while others seem to conflict
with existing patents. Business methods, which had historically been
hard to patent, have found new life via State Street.'
The Ubiquity of Private Information
Because knowledge is easy to expropriate once it is known, firms typically attempt to keep their innovative know-how secret. Firms, therefore, frequently make critical investment and pricing decisions without
knowledge of other firms' decisions and with quite limited knowledge
of what others already have discovered. Sometimes firms may even be
unable to identify whether others are working on the same problems.
A partial picture of the broader knowledge portfolio of a competitor can be gleaned from the competitor's patent portfolio (Rivette and
Kline 2000). While such competitor scanning is of significant value
and may suggest the overall foci of a competitor's research efforts, it
constitutes only a lower bound on the competitors' actual knowledge.
Moreover, even if all inventions were patented, patent know-how disclosures typically lag patent applications by 18 months or more.
Competitors may also rely on trade secret protection rather than on
patent protection, especially when a prospective patent is likely to be
weak. In those cases not only is the know-how private, the extent of
the competitor's know-how may be private as well. An example of this
double level of secrecy is the "walking out" process that Intel discovered in the early 1970s that allowed it to achieve high yields in the production of EPROM circuits. This process left no trace in the product
itself and could not be reverse engineered. Further, if Intel wished to
keep the yield secret, it could have done so (Jackson 1997).
On the other hand, when a firm chooses to patent, it is forced to disclose technical know-how. As we discuss later, the patent may also signal the extent of the firm's total knowledge (patented knowledge and
knowledge held secret).
Strength of Patent Right versus Extent of Private Information
The cost of disclosing knowledge through a patent depends on the
strength of patent rights and the extent of private information. A strong
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patent is very likely to be upheld if challenged, gives the patent-holder
a broad scope of protection (circumvention is difficult), and depth of
protection against infringement. While the importance of validity and
scope is self-evident, the depth of protection against infringement
deserves some comment. Illegal expropriation of knowledge from a
patent may be difficult to detect, especially if the use of the underlying knowledge is not visible in the commercial product embodying the
invention. (One firm only learned that its trade secret had been stolen
by another firm after it had acquired the other firm!) 4 Moreover, even

if detection is easy, it is unclear whether the amount of the infringement damages is sufficient to deter infringement in the first place. In
the United States, the two primary methods used for awarding damages are determination of lost profits and determination of reasonable
royalties. As we discuss below, both methods can be ineffective deterrents to infringement.'
When patents are not strong, a firm is more likely to rely on trade
secrets or some combination of patents and secrecy. This is perhaps one
reason why Cohen et al. (2001) found that in most industries firms rated
secrecy equal to or above patent protection as a means of appropriating
profits. Thus, a defining characteristic of settings involving secrecy is
that private information exists over both the extent of the knowledge
held and the actual knowledge. Issues relating to private information,
therefore, assume increased importance.
The costs and benefits of secrecy depend on several considerations.
How effective is secrecy for protecting the innovative knowledge of the
firm? Are competitors aware of the extent of the firm's knowledge? Will
disclosed knowledge increase the probability that a competitor will
6
invent the next-generation product?

Secrecy cannot protect those innovations where the invention is
disclosed through the product itself. In such cases, even weak patent
protection is preferable to no protection at all. Patents also preempt others from acquiring a patent on the knowledge that a firm could have,
instead, held secret. In the U.S., inventors who employ secrecy expose
themselves to being excluded by subsequent patenting of their inventions by others. In Europe such subsequent patenting poses fewer problems as the Europeans allow the first inventor to continue to use the
invention.
Table 1.1 examines how various combinations of secrecy effectiveness
and patent strength lead to different economic choices. The dimensions
in the table represent the expected situation facing the innovating firm
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prior to its choice of protection mechanism. For example, patent strength
is the expectation of the firm as to how well patents will protect its
intellectual property should the firm choose to patent. Secrecy effectiveness represents the firm's expectation about how much knowledge that
is initially private will become known to others once the product or
service embodying the invention is sold on the market, i.e., via direct
observation or reverse engineering of the product or service itself. The
measure does not account for disclosures made through patenting or
publishing. The secrecy effectiveness dimension separates inventions
into three general categories: naked idea inventions, black box inventions,
and unobserved inventions. Each category of invention may be associated with strong or weak property rights.
A naked idea invention is one where the critical invention is easily
observable in the product or service that embodies that invention. Without strong patent protection, naked idea inventions can be imitated easily. In some cases a first-mover advantage may accrue to the innovator.
In other cases rents will be earned by those who are best able to exploit
the idea (e.g., firms that control relevant complementary assets such as
strong marketing or distribution capabilities). And in still other cases,
all rents will be competed away.
A black box invention is an invention for which the added performance
is obvious when the product or service is observed, but the means-the
magic ingredients-by which the performance is achieved cannot be
readily discerned or reverse engineered. Software often has many of
these features (e.g., Windows operating system).
Many inventions will have combinations of these characteristics. For
example, a new configuration of lenses in a telescope eyepiece can be
easily observed once the product is available in the market and could
not be kept secret short of not selling the product in the first place. However, the lenses of the new eyepiece result in an observable performance
improvement but may be ground using a hidden and novel method.
A third category of invention is the unobserved invention. This category includes, for example, process inventions that allow a previously
offered product to be manufactured for a greatly-reduced cost. Competitors may not even know that there is an innovation, though they
might suspect it if the innovator's price were to change significantly.
Such inventions can be kept secret, but being completely secret might
sacrifice some strategic advantage that might result if rivals knew that
the innovator had substantially lower costs.
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Because the relevant know-how for strategic competition purposes
includes knowledge about follow-on innovation, in many naked idea
inventions some element of private information may still exist. Then
the private information shifts from the basis for the current invention
to knowledge the inventor has that allows for the second generation
product. That private information affects the likely product lifetime of
the current product and will, therefore, also affect pricing and promotion decisions.
Table 1.1 also illuminates how a firm might choose its protection strategy given expectations about the invention's characteristics
regarding patent strength and secrecy effectiveness. The decision to
patent or keep know-how partially or completely secret has implications for a firm's assessment of its competitors' innovation positions
Table 1.1
Secrecy effectiveness versus patent strength
Patent strength

None
(Naked idea)
key invention is
observable in
commercial product/
service and technology
readily imitable
Secrecy
Effectiveness

Strong

Weak

Patent all observable
inventions

Patent but rely on
first-mover or
complementary
asset advantages

Clasp locker (zipper)

Business idea such
as a Greek-Chinese
fusion restaurant

Know-how hidden
(Black box inventions)

Patent most, but
concern about

Rely heavily on
secrecy

key invention cannot
be reverse engineered
but performance
observable

protecting future
generation inventions
Semi-adhesive post-it
note

Coca-Colaformula

Know-how and extent
hidden (Unobserved
inventions)

Patent most and use
know-how disclosure
as signal of extent of
remaining secret
know-how

Rely on secrecy,
but use know-how
disclosure as
signal of extent of
secret know-how

"Reflow" process to aid
in manufacture of MOS
circuits (Jackson 1997)

Cost-reducing
process invention

use of invention not
directly observable
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which then affect investment, pricing, and entry. Oftentimes, it will
benefit the knowledge-holder to signal its advantageous position to its
competitors (while avoiding fully disclosing the underlying know-how
responsible for this advantageous position). Thus, the firm with private
information may signal its position to competitors.
III. Implications for Innovation Incentives
If firms cannot appropriate the value of their innovation, they will have
a limited incentive to invest in innovation. Legal intellectual property
rights such as patents are designed in part to ensure that inventors
appropriate the value of their inventions. Generally, weak property
rights reduce the prize available to a patent holder. Within a specific
context, however, the impact of weak property rights depends in part
on whether the intellectual property in question can be protected by
other means and the incentives of the innovator's competitors to use
the innovator's know-how.
Zero Property Rights Does Not Equal Zero Appropriation: Protection
by Other Means
At the extreme, weak property rights approach no property rights, a
characteristic typifying early-stage conceptions of many creative ideas.
But the absence of property rights does not exclude appropriation. For
example, an inventor without property rights can still appropriate rents
even when she must fully reveal the know-how of the invention to sell
it to a firm.
In Anton and Yao (1994), full revelation by an inventor to a buyer
prior to a contract still results in a significant payoff for the inventor.
The reason is that revelation creates a credible "blackmail threat." 7 By
revealing the invention, the seller removes the buyer's initial skepticism about the value of the previously unseen invention, but now faces
the possibility that the now-informed buyer can freely expropriate the
invention when there are no property rights. This is, of course, the classic market for ideas problem Arrow identified (1962). The buyer, however, has a strong incentive to preserve its information monopoly and
prevent the seller from going elsewhere. This incentive leads the buyer
to offer a contract that provides incentives to the seller not to sell the
idea to a third party. The absence of property rights then becomes a
two-edged sword and the buyer must pay an (expected) amount that
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is on the order of duopoly profits to eliminate gains-to-trade between
the inventor and a potential second buyer. Thus, even with no property rights, the payoff to innovation investments can be significant. The
key element is that private information effectively confers an economic
property right on an innovator and this information advantage can be
leveraged into a significant payoff relative to the market value of the
invention. In turn, policy assessments of property rights should recognize that innovation incentives are not necessarily forced to zero by the
absence of formal property rights.8
Further, not all firms that have access to an invention are similarly
situated with regard to the development and subsequent commercialization of the invention. In many cases, a firm with nonexclusive access
to an invention can appropriate the invention's value because of control
of complementary assets such as superior marketing or manufacturing
capabilities. (See, e.g., Teece 1986). Anand and Galetovic (2004) discuss
numerous other means through which innovators can appropriate rents
even in settings with limited property right protection.
The Impact of Weak Property Rights on Imitation and Infringement
If a firm anticipates that its invention will have only weak intellectual
property protection, holding other factors constant, it is arguably less
likely to invest in such innovation in the first place. The actual impact
of weak IP protection, however, ultimately depends on the economic
choices made by the innovator and its competitors.
Innovator and Imitator Choices. Consider first some choices an
innovator may make given weak property rights. With the exception of
naked idea inventions, the innovator always has the option of protection via secrecy. This option establishes a lower bound on the payoff
available to an innovator. Under weak property rights the innovator
would disclose its invention to get some modest probability of legal
protection against direct imitators. Trade secrets provide no legal protection (except via contract) and need not result in disclosure beyond
that which is unavoidable through product inspection. In fact, reliance
on trade secrets opens up the innovator to infringement questions
should a competitor invent and patent. Because innovations are rarely
composed of a monolithic piece of knowledge, a combination of patenting and secrecy is common. An innovator may also preempt imitation
by licensing the weakly protected invention to imminent competitors.
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An innovation choice regarding the balance of patent and trade
secret protection depends on anticipating what the competitors would
do, which depends, in part, on the competitor's perceptions of how
much innovative knowledge the innovator possesses. For example,
how much a potential licensee would be willing to pay for a license
depends on what know-how it receives and what additional knowhow the licensor retains for the licensor's own advantage.' Weak patent
rights may induce an innovator to hold some of its know-how secret,
thereby leaving the potential licensee with no direct way of learning
the full extent of the innovator's knowledge. This critical information
asymmetry potentially interferes with the valuation calculation that
underlies a licensing negotiation or, alternatively, a cost assessment that
impacts competition absent a license.
The message with respect to imitator choice is that in settings with
private information (e.g., where secrecy is employed) the innovator
will often have an incentive to signal its strength on a dimension relevant to either innovative or product market competition. For example,
if the innovator's signals persuade an imitator that the innovator has
a significant cost advantage, the imitator will be less aggressive in the
ensuing product market competition.
Innovation Investment: Failure Has Its Reward Too. Consider the
implications of weak property rights and private information for innovation investment decisions when two or more firms are competitors
in innovation, e.g., racing for the patent. Under strong patents, the
incentives for firms to invest are strong as the competitors vie for the
"monopoly" position." But in the case of weak patents, the reward
associated with winning and the "costs" attendant to losing the race
are moderated. The reduction in the cost of losing reflects the fact that
the loser under weak patents can more easily circumvent the patentee's
invention. This "reward" to failure is a force which decreases the incentive for investment by decreasing the relative difference in competitive
positions before and after the innovation race.
Even when a patent provides legal protection against expropriation
of innovative knowledge, strategic infringement actions can reduce the
expected costs of infringement under patent damage rules commonly
used in the United States. Consider, for instance, a process innovation
within the context of a market competition between two firms. This
situation provides the infringer with an opportunity to manipulate
the resulting legal damage award via market choices. One form this
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opportunity can take is "passive infringement," which occurs when the
infringer takes all of their gains from the process innovation via internal
cost reduction with no changes in market behavior." Even when policy
is oriented toward protecting the profit of the innovator, as with the lost
profits damage award (restoring the innovator's profits to the level that
would have been earned absent infringement), innovation incentives
will be reduced. Passive infringement, by construction, leaves the profit
outcome of the innovator unaffected and so the reward to an innovation success is not reduced. However, the reward to an innovation failure is greater (as infringement is profitable) and so each firm has less
incentive to invest in R&D.12
The analysis of weak property rights in the presence of private information leads to several results. First, weak patent rights are not fatal to
innovation incentives. Second, weak patent rights increase the level of
private information. Both of these results affect the strategic interactions
between the innovator and its competitors. The reliance on patenting
versus trade secrecy becomes affected by the strategic value associated
with appearing "tough" and smaller technical advances are economically better protected than larger advances under weak patent rights.
Finally, the incentives for an imitator to risk infringement are increased
by the availability of infringement choices that take advantage of the
methods by which the courts assess infringement damages. In sum,
an increased incentive to infringe generally corresponds to decreased
incentives for innovation.
IV. Implications for Disclosure Incentives
(i.e., Patents versus Trade Secrets)
In addition to encouraging innovation, another critical purpose of the
patent system is to encourage know-how disclosures. Weak patents
prompt innovating firms to rely more heavily on secrecy, which, in
turn, reduces the amount of knowledge publicly disclosed. Note that if
product inspection or reverse-engineering reliably yielded all relevant
information, then the policy benefit from patent disclosure would be
diminished (if not eliminated).
Reliance on secrecy increases the importance of the private information held by the innovator for both subsequent innovation competition and product market competition. Consider, for example, a process
innovation setting corresponding to the case of an unobserved invention
under weak patent rights (see table 1.1) in which greater innovative
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know-how translates into lower costs. Recall that an unobserved invention refers to an invention in which both the extent of know-how and
the actual know-how are private knowledge of the innovator. In the
case of product market competition, a firm will be less aggressive if
it thinks that the other firm has lower costs. Because the actual cost
(through innovation) of the firm is unknown to its competitor, the value
of appearing to have low costs creates an incentive for firms to take
actions to persuade their competitors that they have low costs. A primary means through which this can be done is to disclose a portion of
one's know-how developed through investment in innovation.
The economic rationale for disclosure incentives hinges on a cost/
benefit comparison. The cost of disclosing commercially valuable information, whether through patents, research papers, conferences, or other
public methods of dissemination, is that market rivals may be able to
improve their own capabilities. The benefit derives from the assessment
rivals will make about the true underlying capability of the disclosing
firm. This is the familiar notion of market competition in a strategic substitutes setting-a firm would prefer that a rival believe it has a strong
capability (such as low costs) rather than a weak capability because
this leads the rival to adopt a less aggressive market position (such as
reducing output or abstaining from making entry investments). Partial
disclosure has the desirable feature of preserving at least some of the
advantage for oneself while providing convincing know-how evidence
for rivals that innovative progress has, in fact, occurred.
The economic forces driving disclosure choices by innovators and
reactions of rivals typically lead to an outcome in which an inventing
firm is able to appropriate a higher proportion of the value of small
versus large inventions. That is, firms with more modest inventions are
often led to make full disclosures because the benefit margin swamps
the cost margin while those with greater advances rely more heavily on
secrecy. Firms with greater advances seek to separate themselves via
disclosure from those with lesser advances and this creates an incentive
to make larger disclosures. However, larger disclosures transfer more
valuable information to a rival and lead to less appropriation of value
by the innovating firm.
The economic incentive for disclosure with this sort of process innovation is based on the idea that "I would like you to know that I have
low costs but I do not want you to know how Ido it." Figure 1.1 provides
a graph of the resulting relationship between disclosure and innovation
that can arise in equilibrium, with a convex shape being the typical
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outcome (see Anton and Yao 2003,2004). Small innovations, which mean
high costs in the case of process innovation, are often fully revealed.
With larger innovations, meaning lower costs, disclosure is partial and
the firm resorts to secrecy to a greater extent (convex shape).
To interpret the structure underlying the graph, imagine that the
highest cost level, cH, corresponds to a patent for a new product with a
minimal specification of how it can be produced (point A in figure 1.1).
Lower values for c correspond to better process innovation outcomes
regarding the product and the disclosure levels correspond to disclosures about the know-how involved. The inventing firm can obtain the
patent with a minimal disclosure or it can choose to include additional
claims (or even separate patent applications). The disclosure curve then
shows how, in equilibrium, a firm with privately observed cost c will
choose to disclose. As a rough guide, the incentive structure is that any
disclosure associated with a small innovation (costs close to cH) forces
an innovator with a more significant innovation to make a larger disclosure as they seek to convince rivals that they are, in fact, stronger
competitors in the market.
At point B in figure 1.1 we have the situation of an innovator with
a significant advance. The true extent of process innovation is given
by the production cost on the horizontal axis. The disclosure of this
firm regarding its innovation is at the vertical level corresponding to
point B. As this point lies above the 450 line, secrecy is being employed.
Since the cost level of cH corresponds to a minimal know-how specification, the vertical distance from cH to point B measures the extent to
which disclosure allows a rival to reduce costs. The vertical distance
from point B to the 450 line then measures the cost advantage the firm
has chosen to maintain, via secrecy, relative to rival firms. Note that as
we move to the left in figure 1.1 and consider firms that have innovated
to a greater extent, both of the vertical gaps increase but the reliance on
secrecy is more extensive.
Figure 1.1 exhibits two different disclosure curves, corresponding to
whether patent rights are strong or weak. The parameter y is an index
for the strength of patent rights, such as the probability of invalidity
or compensation via legal damages for infringement. As patent rights
become perfect and y goes to 1, we are pushed to the 450 line: when
the risk of competitor use vanishes, an innovating firm reveals the
full extent of innovation. As y falls the disclosure graph shifts up and
secrecy is employed more often. The limiting position when patent
rights vanish is not, however, a horizontal line at height cH at which all
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information beyond a minimal level is withheld. Instead, the limiting
position when patent rights vanish is one where the tradeoff between
signaling and technology transfer to a rival is still operative and
the disclosure curve lies between the extremes of minimal and full
disclosure.
An important observation for policy follows from this last point: an
absence of formal patent rights does not translate into complete secrecy.
As with our above discussion where we argued that rent appropriation
and innovation incentives are still possible in the absence of property
rights, we see that firms will still have an incentive to make public disclosures about their innovations. To the extent that social benefits of
disclosure underlie the right to exclude others via a patent (and the creation of monopoly power), it is important to recognize that the benchmark position is not one of complete secrecy.
Depending on the degree of invention (i.e., reduction of costs), the
relative cost of disclosing usable technical know-how changes. Firms
with smaller inventive steps face lower costs of revealing this technical know-how for two reasons. First, the cost to infringing is disproportionately greater than the benefits when infringement involves
small inventions. Second, if another firm has invested in innovation
(though failed to get the patent), it likely made at least some progress

Disclosure
level

A

CH

Signaling incentive
dominates
ysmall
Signaling and
technology transfer
incentives balanced
ylarge

y indexes strength
of property rights

c

CH

Innovator's private (cost) information
Figure 1 .1
Disclosure and private information.
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in cost reduction. Then, the full disclosure of the smaller invention is
not so harmful as the competitor is likely to "know" that invention
already. This implies that the (marginal) cost of disclosure vanishes at
cH whereas the (marginal) benefit is still positive. Consequently, a firm
with a modest invention will disclose fully as the benefit swamps the
cost. In both of these cases, however, firms with more significant inventions will face a positive cost margin and the tradeoff comes back into
play, leading to only partial disclosure.
For a specific context, suppose legal damages for infringement take
the form of "reasonable royalties" and that the competitor must decide
between staying with a prior generation technology (cost of cH) and
risking a court finding of infringement by using the disclosed information of the patenting firm. For any disclosure near cH, the firms are
almost symmetric in the market competition and the sizeable market
share of the rival implies a large expected royalty damage. Staying with
the safe technology is better and because of this, the patenting firm will
fully disclose in this range.
Another interesting implication for IP policy is that partial disclosure by the innovator and infringement by a rival go hand-in-hand in
equilibrium. That is, the situations in which the inventor chooses to
rely on secrecy, at least in part, are also the situations in which the rival
will find it profitable to infringe the patent right. Intuitively, if a partial
disclosure could deter infringement then it would be advantageous for
the weaker innovator to mimic the disclosure (which is feasible since it
is a partial disclosure). In these cases, the increased market competition
provides a cap of sorts on monopoly distortions in the market.
V. Implications for Competition and Antitrust Policy
Antitrust authorities consider the implications of patents on competition in many contexts ranging from proposed mergers to the conduct of
standard-setting organizations.13 One important concern has been with
potentially anticompetitive settlements of patent litigation. The resolution of litigation through settlement is typically efficient and should
be encouraged. In some cases, however, the settlement process can be
hijacked for anticompetitive purposes. The existence of weak patent
rights complicates the analysis of whether a particular patent dispute
settlement constitutes an antitrust violation.
Patent litigation typically focuses upon whether the patents at issue
are valid and/or infringed. For ease of explication, this section will
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focus on validity issues rather than the related issue of infringement.
A primary reason patents are invalidated is that previous patents or
publications anticipate the teachings of the patent and, therefore, the
claimed invention is not "nonobvious." Patent litigation is typically
expensive and unpredictable. Not surprisingly, litigants frequently settle their disputes prior to a judicial ruling on validity. Such settlements
include a wide variety of elements, including, for example, monetary
payments, licensing, and/or agreements to discontinue the alleged
infringing use.
Antitrust law recognizes that a valid patent grants exclusivity of
use to the patent-holder. Therefore, many agreements between
horizontally-related parties that would normally constitute law violations are permitted when the agreement involves a valid patent.
Whether a patent is valid or not--effectively a crude assessment of patent strength-may determine the range of permissible agreements.
Consider the following example: A patent holder sues an alleged
infringer who counter-claims that the patent is invalid. A settlement
is reached wherein the alleged infringer receives favorable licensing
terms. To what extent is or should society's estimation of the settlement
reflect the strength of the underlying patent? If the patent is strong, the
patent holder is entitled to the market power that the patent's exclusivity conveys.14 Part and parcel of that is the considerable leeway the
patent holder enjoys as it pertains to licensing. Stated alternatively, the
patent holder as "monopolist" is permitted to reach a settlement that
creates a duopoly involving the patent-holder and the alleged infringer.
A comparable outcome given a weak patent would, however, be
potentially anticompetitive, if, for example, the result would be prices
that are higher than what would have resulted had the patent been
invalidated."5
Perhaps the most important part of this example is that which is
assumed. Distinguishing patents according to strength can be extremely
difficult. This is particularly true when the information needed for such
an assessment is private and divulgence of that information is not in the
interests of those who hold it. Consequently, weak patent rights may
increase opportunities for anticompetitive conduct while, at the same
time, may decrease the ease with which such conduct can be detected
and stopped.
How can or should the antitrust agencies address patent strength
when they assess the competitive impact of a patent settlement? Numerous mechanisms have been proposed to facilitate treatment of dubious
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patents in antitrust cases. Some proposals facilitate direct evaluation of
patent strength. For example, the antitrust agencies themselves could
request PTO re-examination of competitively significant patents. The
FTC took this approach at least once in the past and has expressed a
renewed interest in it (FTC Report 2003).
The antitrust agencies could, in theory, evaluate patent strength
themselves, though the institutional challenges attendant to such an
undertaking are numerous. As a threshold matter, there is the problem of expertise and resources. Evaluating patent validity issues is an
extremely resource-intensive enterprise. Further, government challenges to settlements encounter the additional obstacle that the antitrust defendants (the parties to what would have been the underlying
patent dispute) are most likely to have the best information regarding
patent strength as well as an "often strong incentive to submerge or
conceal pertinent information..." (Bowman 1973, p. 242).16
In addition to those practical issues, there is arguably a more fundamental question concerning the proper scope of an antitrust agency's
institutional role. Should the agency be engaged in such determinations or should the determinations be left to the PTO and the courts?
Given these constraints, at least one proposal has advocated that
the antitrust agencies engage in a limited, but direct, assessment of
patent strength.17 Another set of proposals takes a less direct approach
and involves agency evaluation of "objective indicators of patent validity." That is to say, "antitrust regulators could attempt to identify proxies for patent validity-objective criteria or behavioral conditions that
make economic sense only if the patent rights are invalid." The most
common indicator or "red flag" includes payments from the patentee
to the challenger or "reverse payments." (O'Rourke and Brodley 2003,
p. 1784.)
VI. Implications for Organizational Incentives and
Entrepreneurial Activity
Weak property rights and private information also affect intra and interorganizational structure and relationship decisions. In this section, we
take the perspective that in knowledge-based industries, an important
perspective on understanding organizational structure is to view structure as a knowledge-management choice. (See, e.g., Teece and Chesbrough 1996, Rajan and Zingales 1998, and Demski et al., 1999). From
this perspective some choices regarding organizational structure are

Anton, Greene, and Yao

best understood as "remedying" undesired knowledge flows across
division and firm boundaries.
We briefly discuss how organizational and relationship decisions
affect (1) potential conflict of interest problems within a firm that
provides multiple products or services and (2) incentives to create
and exploit inventions and to move intellectual property across firm
boundaries.
Organization Structure and Conflicts of Interest
Proprietary information learned during the course of transactions
between firms frequently has value in other unauthorized uses.
For example, a consulting firm that learns one client's future marketing strategy might find that information valuable in consulting
with another client. While the confidentiality of client information is
legally protected, under some circumstances that information may be
strategically leaked to advantage-or if the same people are involved
with both clients, it may be impossible to "forget" the other client's
information.
While legal protections are typically available to deter breaches of
confidentiality, it is difficult to discover and then effectively stop knowledge leakage. Thus, in many circumstances, confidentiality agreements
may confer only "weak" property rights to the protected knowledge.
Demski et al. (1999) examined this abuse of confidential information
problem and the impact of organizational and ownership structure on
the amount of abuse. In their model an employee of a (consulting) firm
has an incentive to misuse a client's proprietary information and the
client (e.g., a consulting client) cannot monitor the misuse. Misuse is
anticipated by the client and is reflected in a lower fee. The firm's choice
of an employee incentive structure moderates but does not generally
eliminate an employee's incentive to misuse proprietary information.
High-powered (strongly performance-based) incentives for employees
increase the extent to which proprietary information is (mis)used by
employees, so firms that need to reduce misuse of information decouple performance from pay. Firms may also find it valuable to make
observable investments by erecting "Chinese walls" to increase the
costs of information flow (e.g., the firms can locate two divisions in different physical locations), thereby increasing information security and,
hence, client fees. As a matter of public policy, the firm also benefits
from increased legal liability for proprietary information. This liability
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assures the client that the firm has incentives to structure its organization and incentive choices to improve information security.
Conflicts of interest also appear in transactions involving an upstream
firm, e.g., a satellite manufacturer that must rely on an integrated
downstream firm, e.g., a launch vehicle supplier, which also owns a
rival to the upstream firm. The upstream firm frequently must share
proprietary information with the downstream firm to achieve appropriate coordination efficiencies. But the downstream firm may find it in
its self-interest to divulge some of this proprietary information with its
upstream subsidiary, thereby potentially biasing the upstream competition in favor of the integrated firm. 8

Creationand Exploitation of Inventions: Ownership, Control, and the
Movement of Ideas and Inventions across Firm Boundaries
Within a firm, inventions may be either the creations of an individual or
a team of individuals. This situation is the source of many potential difficulties. Consider the case of an individual that discovers an important
insight into an invention while working in the firm, but the knowledge
is prepatent or is unpatentable. She could disclose this insight to the

firm (after all she is an employee of the firm), but she might worry that
once the firm has the information it will not reward her. Alternatively,

she can take advantage of the relatively liberal U.S. employment law
and either take the idea elsewhere or leave and develop the idea in her
own start-up.
An employee's knowledge is private information pending disclosure.
Weak property rights exist in this setting in three ways. First, no formal
property rights (e.g., patents) are established over the invention insight.
Second, if the employer owns the property right, it may still be difficult for the employer to effectively enforce it (i.e., firm can't establish
that the employee learned the idea prior to departure). 9 Third, while
the employee would normally own the property right, say because the
insight was developed after hours, the employer might still be able to
exploit the knowledge under the penumbra of its rights as employer,
claiming the key conception occurred during company time and with
company resources.
A number of recent court cases highlight the tension between inventor-employees and their employers. One prominent case involves Shuji
Nakamura who in 1990 received a $150 bonus from his employer,
Nichia, after revealing his blue light LED invention. In subsequent
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litigation, Nakamura argued that the company did not support his
research, which he pursued primarily after hours. In 1999, a Japanese
court awarded Nakamura $100 million in damages.2" Court documents
indicate Nichia reported $1.15 billion in profits in 2004 on the sale of
products based on Nakamura's invention.21
Returning to the individual employee-inventor example, rather than
leaving, the employee could reveal the concept to the firm and seek
to bargain for payment. 2 Disclosure weakens the bargaining position
of the employee because once the concept is disclosed, the employer
can develop this concept without further compensating the employee,
though it may then have to compete with a start-up begun by the exemployee. By remaining silent and departing, however, the employee
can pursue a start-up which will encounter less competition from the
former employer, who lacks the information to compete. In these settings, the departure option is often more attractive, even when in-house
development generates a larger private joint reward. 3
Numerous public policy levers can alter the outcome of this employeeemployer relationship. One set of levers involves changing the strength
of the underlying patent and/or trade secret property rights. A second
set of levers involves the breadth of rights given to those associated
with the invention.24
In the employer-employee relationship, the existence of private
information can lead to property rights remaining economically weak
for the employer notwithstanding policy shifts toward a stronger legal
property right regime. If the invention can receive strong patent protection, then the outside reward to the employee from remaining silent
and leaving the firm to form a start-up will likely increase. Similarly,
stronger trade secret protection can be expected to improve the bargaining position of the employer, provided that the employer is aware
of the invention. Consequently, the incentive of the employee to remain
silent (rather than reveal the invention to the employer) and depart may
increase since the prospect of a reward from the firm is diminished.
Therefore, because private information impacts the ability to acquire
and enforce property rights, the net impact of stronger legal protection
may be a weaker economic property right for the employer.
A similar counterintuitive effect can arise when legal "shop rights"
govern the relationship between the firm and employee. Shop rights
allow the employer free nonexclusive use of an employee's invention
when that invention was created using the employer's resources. If the
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firm learns of an invention, for instance after the employee departs to
form a start-up, then it may be able to exercise shop rights over that
invention. This implies a weaker effective property right for the departing employee/inventor and a smaller start-up reward. In these cases
the weaker property right translates into an increased likelihood that
the firm and employee will be able to contract successfully and develop
the invention jointly.
VII.

Conclusion

Weak patents have strong implications for competitive behavior. By
inducing more use of secrecy to protect innovation, weak patents cause
key economic decisions to be made under conditions of private information. Private information is especially salient for settings involving
black box or unobserved inventions.
Private information considerations affect choices of how to protect
inventions and the possibility and nature of infringement. Weak patents increase the likelihood of imitation and infringement and increase
the use of secrecy. This, in turn, affects innovation investment, potentially reducing the gain from being a winner in a patent race and the
amount of knowledge that becomes publicly disclosed.
Changes in judicial determinations of damages can increase incentives to innovate. Under the current system, firm strategies to minimize
damages while gaining net advantages from infringing make infringement more likely and reduce the general incentives to innovate. The
inclusion of some level of profit disgorgement from the infringer (but
not necessarily to the patent holder) would discourage such infringement strategies.
Our discussion also highlights some implications of weak patents for
antitrust policy. Weak patent rights increase the likelihood of patent
litigation over commercially valuable patents. Such litigation raises,
however, the specter of anticompetitive settlements. Greater oversight
by the antitrust agencies in the area of intellectual property settlements
would arguably help rein in such behavior. Current antitrust efforts,
however, are hampered by a lack of patent expertise and possible political resistance to an expansion of the antitrust agencies' role into patent
assessments. Encouraging the antitrust agencies to refer some patents
for re-examination by the patent office would facilitate agency investigation of potentially anticompetitive settlements.
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Weak property rights result not only from limited scope of legal
protection but also from the difficulties associated with discovering
unauthorized use of intellectual property. Two important settings where
discovery is difficult are breaches of confidentiality and loss of intellectual property through employee departure. In the former case, increasing judicial penalties for breach of confidentiality would induce firms
to adopt more secure incentive schemes and/or to make more investments in information security. In the latter case, however, an increase
in the strength of legal property rights will not necessarily reduce the
loss of intellectual property through employee departure. Increases in
strength have the direct effect of reducing the loss of intellectual property that the employer knows about, but this effect can be offset because
stronger legal property rights also encourage the employee to keep
more inventions secret from the employer in anticipation of leaving to
launch a start-up.
Endnotes
1. Two problems with determining the percentage of dubious patents are that validity
challenges are less likely when a patent is obviously strong and, conversely, many questionable patents may be licensed rather than litigated. Also, patents that are not invalidated but are narrowed will not necessarily count as being overturned. See, e.g., Jaffe and
Lerner (2004) for an extended discussion of such issues and other estimates of reversal
percentages.
2. The degree to which patent applications face examination scrutiny varies from country to country. Kingston (1984) noted that some countries have issued patents with very
little examination (e.g., South Africa) while others have examined patent applications
with considerably more scrutiny (e.g., Germany).

3. State Street Bank and Trust Company v. SignatureFinancialCorp., Inc. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).

4. Northern PetrochemicalsCo. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7 " Cir. 1973).
5. One problem is that the damages do not account for the probability that an infringement is not discovered.
6. See generally, Scotchmer and Green (1990), Gallini (1992), and Bessen and Maskin
(2000).
7. A second reason, developed in Anton and Yao (2002), derives from the option of partial revelation by the inventor. By disclosing only a portion of the intellectual property,
a seller can induce potential buyers to bid via contract offers to attract the seller and
acquire the remaining portion. In these settings, it is the prospect of acquiring additional
IP (versus denying it to a rival) that provides an innovation reward when there are no
property rights.
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8. The no-property rights setting may reflect complete absence of property rights or a
setting in which the transaction is contemplated prior to when property rights can be
obtained.
9. For example, BASF has licensed a previous generation process for making the chemical phthalic anhydride while using its own later-generation process (Foster 1986).
10. For this discussion, we are assuming no market power in the preinvention status quo.
See Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and the subsequent literature on dominant firms and the
persistence of monopoly.
11. This discussion is based on Anton and Yao (2005).
12. Circumvention does not merely mean that a firm can imitate, it also makes it easier
for the firm to make better use of whatever knowledge it developed through Its own
innovation investment.
13. See, e.g., Tom and Gillman (2003) who list more than a dozen nonmerger cases in
which patent uncertainty has arisen in antitrust cases before the U.S. courts or antitrust
agencies.
14. That is, the market power depends on how much competition exists from noninfringing substitutes.

15. See, e.g., Shapiro (1985), (2003) and Choi (1998). There are also examples, of course,
in which the antitrust bonafides are sufficiently clear that the outcome would remain the
same regardless of any clarification of patent strength.
16. Evidentiary standards present another obstacle to antitrust cases involving patents.
Under the law patents are presumed valid. Those challenging the patent must demonstrate based on "clear and convincing evidence" that the patent should not have issued.
This high standard is imposed despite the fact that when the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) evaluates a patent application, it determines whether to issue the patent based on
the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Arguably, this escalation of patent
strength, a practice that has been soundly criticized by many including the FTC, contributes to the ability of owners of weak patents to game the system (FTC Report 2003).
17. The government would consider whether the plaintiff's "ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant" Hovenkamp et al. (2003). "This oversight necessarily requires some inquiry into the merits of the IP suit, but we think it need
not be particularly searching." Id. But see O'Rourke and Brodley (2003) for a discussion
of what "significant" means as a practical matter.
18. See "Martin Marietta to 'Build Wall' Between Satellite and Launch-Vehicle Divisions
to Settle FTC Charges over General Dynamics Acquisition," Federal Trade Commission
Press Release March 25,1994. This general class of problem has been analyzed by Hughes
and Kao (2001).
19. It is difficult for an employer to win a suit against an employee who has departed
with an idea when the arguably misappropriated idea was in a formative stage and possibly was not even known to the firm. See, e.g., Merges (1999). Almeida and Kogut's
(1999) analysis of the knowledge flow in the semiconductor industry finds that employee
mobility is a important influence on the local transfer of knowledge between firms.
20. This award was subsequently reduced in a later settlement to a reported $8 million
which was still a precedent-setting settlement in Japan for an employee-inventor.
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21. Managing Intellectual Property,March 2004, p. 1.
22. This discussion is based on Anton and Yao (1995).
23. See Aghion and Tirole (1994) for an analysis of how ownership and control of property rights affects innovation effort and innovation investment under strong property
rights.
24. A third set of levers involves allowing the firm more freedom to write employee contracts that restrict employee mobility.
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